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MAXWELL v. MIMAMSA
Justice B. N. Srikrishna*
One of the maior funcuais of a judge is to interpret the law so that it can be effectively applied to a fact
siruation before him.
Salmond describes interpretation or construction as the process by which courts seek to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed. According to Gray, the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who has occasion to
search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from the words of a statute book, a meaning which he
either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to it, is called 'interpretaion.' According to Allen, the operation of a statute is not automatic, and can never be so. Like all legal
rules, it has to operate through application - in other words, through the interpretation of the courts'
The main ask of the Judge would, therefore, be to discover the true meaning of the words used by the
legislature, and its intention in the enactment, since itis presumed to have expressed its will in the words
of the enactment.
The English Courts have developed anumberof principles which are of immense help in the construction
and interpretation of statutes, which have become hallowed, not by prescription, but by usage over
centuries.AtwellinthelrpretationofStattes has come to occupy the centre stage in this field symbolising
the cannons of interpretation evolved by the English Courts over several centuries.
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine if an indigenous alternative can be posited for the
principles of interpretation of statutes synbolised byAlrnell One such alternative systern of interpretation
prevalent in India is the mimansa system fine-crafted by the Indian thinkers over millennia. Lately, there
have been attempts in judicial assays and treatises to project this system as a credible and viable alternative.
Thus, it becomes necessary to examine as to how far the principles of mimarn.ra could supplant or
supplement the cannons of construction presently adopted by the Indian Courts as compared to the
Maxelan.sft
. Here it is necessary to make a brief survey to highlight the broad thinking of the Indian
wstems of knowledge.
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Three broad schools of Indian philosophy need to be considered in this regard. Each has developed
highly refined theories of knowledge transmission which would be relevant to our discussion. The theories
developed are inter-disciplinary, but with convergence of the principles of gakarana (grammar), mimsamsa
(exegesis) and nyaya (logic), each enriching the others by the cross-fertilisation of ideas and concepts In
fact, these three are respectively described as the shastrasof pada, vaka andpramana. Pada comprises the
theories of grammarians with regard to semantics, etymology, construction of words, their meanings
and rules of gram mar. Vak'a comprises construction of words in syntactical sentences and intricate
rules for resolution of conflict or ambiguity in the sentences of a text. Pramanaconsists of the rules of
Indian system of logic which determine the theoretical basis for validation of any kind of knowledge
including knowledge gained through words.
According to Bharerthari,a philosopher and a grammarianpar excellence who flourished during the second
half of the 5"' century B.C., there are three levels of speech - vaikhari,mad/jamaandpashayanti.Vaikhad
is the most distinguished level when speech is uttered and heard by the listener. lad/yamais known only
to the speaker and arises to the intellect; at this stage speech would not have a temporal construct of a
final sentence, but word and meaning are still distinct. Pashayanh is where there is a sphota (a flash or
explosion) which results in the meaning of the word comes forth bursting or shining This is perceived b
the mind as pratibba, the immediate super-sensuous intuition and one of the terms for description of
knowledge as "direct Iowledge." This is then experienced as an impulse to communicate, which Dbiarribasi
calls kratii. The communication has two aspects - the objective meaning, artha, and the word or sound to
be uttered, dibani. Although these are differentiated in the mind, they are but two sides of the same coin,
the qphota. As each letter sound emerges from the speaker, the whole obota is communicated and the
meaning of the sentence flashes in the mind of the listener
The nyqya shastra,school of Indian logic, holds that tatparyaorthe intention of the speaker is instrumental
in transmitting the meaning of an uttered sentence to the listener. According to the nairyikas, every
word has two levels of meaning-machyartbaand gangartha(also known asabbidaand lakshana). T5chyarba
is the direct meaning of the word; zyangyartha is its indirect or implied meaning. The aawyikar postulate
that ttparyais the prime cause of shabdabodha,the meaning of a sentence desired to be conveyed by the
speaker.' That is why where no meaning can be extracted from a sentence by its syntactical analysis, they
postulatedc tha the situation would give rise to the second variety of meaning called 'lakshana'orfigurative
meaning.' Thus, if a sentence like 'Gangayaw ghorhah' is uttered, literally it means that the village is in
Ganga. Obviously, the village cannot be in the waters of the river Ganga. Hence, there is Iatparyaanppatti
or incomprehension. Consequently, the sentence is interpreted as being merely figurative in the sense
that the village is on the banks of the river, almost touching it.
What exactly is the meaning of the term 'taparya? While the BbashaParichbedadefines it as the desire of
a speaker, the Tarka Sangrahagives a more logical definition and states that when there is utterance of a
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Ma7eV1v. MiWasa
particular word with a desire to convey one's idea to others, such desire or intention of the speaker is
called tatparjm *
The meaning of a word which goes by the technical term
one oF the following eight ways:'
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)

vi)
vii)
viii)

twtrFr, according to

the naiycrika, is learnt in

by grammar- as the meaning of roots, trminations and declensions;
by comparison, as when the meaning of the word 'ganya' is known because of its similarity with
a cow;
by reference to a Lexicon,
express assertion by a credible person (such as 'a kokik' is also known as 'pika');
usage of elders - when an elder tells another to bring, or to take away a cow or jar, the child
notices on each occasion the meaning of the action 'to bring' and of the nouns like 'jar' and
'cow', which get conveyed to and fixed in its mind;
by the context; -by explanations or paraphrase;
by association with another known word.

Broadly speaking, the Tarka Sangrabapostulates three criteria on the basis of which the intention of the
speaker can be ascertained. They are:prakania(context) tirheshana(qualifier) and desa (space). For example,
the word A71 in Sanskrit means'horse' and also'salt'. If the occasion is one of going for a battle, then
the sentence atrcr
('bring the Saindham', means bring the horse'); but when uttered during a meal,
itwould obviously refer to salt. Similarly, the word 9T (door), when uttered by a speaker is ambiguous by
itself for it is not known as to what is to be done with reference to the door. If it is summer, and the room
is hot, the intention of the speaker can be gathered as a request to open the door to allow in air; when
there is biting cold, the intention would he a request to shut the door. Dinakarasays that when a particular
sentence is uttered in order to convey a particular intention, the knowledge of such intention of the
speaker is the cause of verbal comprehension.'
After discussing various theories as to resolution of ambiguousness in the usage of words and sentences,
Dinakarapostulates bis final conclusion by saying that, if there is a doubt or confusion as to the intention
of the speaker, or if there is the ascertainment of that which is not intended by the speaker, the verbal
comprehension from the sentence is not at all possible. Hence, according to him, the knowledge of
intention has to be taken as the cause of shabda bodha or verbal comprehension."
Bhiarriian in his 0 kyapad!a postulates a few more criteria for determining the tatryg'a of a sentence.
According to him, association, contradiction, context, connotation, proximity of other words, place,
time and intonation are also indicia on the basis of which the tatparya of the speaker is ascertained.12
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If a speaker of a sentence is present before us, and we are unable to grasp his tapata,it is possible to ask
him as to what exactly he means by his sentence. I( however, this process of ascertainment of the true
intendon is not possible, then an alternative means of ascertainment of the taipar has to be devised.
This was the situation faced by mimamsakaxwho were concerned with the interpretation of the sentences
in the srbod r(a). The shrud, according to them, was eternal and had no known origin or originator.
Hence, there was no way of ascertainment of the meaning of the sentences in the sbrdf by interlocution.
This led them to construct 'hyperfine' doctrines for ascertainment of the meaning of the sentences used
in the shr. This also led them to an elaborate process of reconciliation of conflicts and resolution of
doubts arising from apparent inconsistencies or contradictions in the Shruti texts.
In course of time, the principles of interpretation of sbred nkyas evolved by the mimaskas became
formalised. Their formal expression appears in the aphorisms or stras of Jaimini on which an explanatory
work (hbasbya) was written by Shabaraswami. Further sub-commentaries like the Sboka 1/ardika,
Tanrraiardaand Tapdka of KImarlibbatta followed by other treatises by mimarnsakas like Prabbakara,
Parthasarathi Mishra, Sayanacharya and others have built up this elaborate system. Thus developed an
expert system of knowledge which came to be recognised as one of the six Schools of Indian philosophy
by the name of poorm :nirnassa.
The minamarkas were basically concerned with the resolution of conflicts, ambiguities and apparent
contradictions noticed in shrubhakyas. This they considered necessary for a correct exegesis of the shrun
so that the rituals prescribed therein could be accurately performed, leading to the achievement of merit
Athough, these rules were basically intended to apply to shrmdwakw dealing with religious injunc-ons,
subsequendh, they came to be applied for resolution of apparent contradiction, conflict or ambigniti in
textual sentences in smrid, which were applicable both in the sphere of religion as well as secular legal
relationships.
Prior to the codification of Hindu Law in 1956, different aspects of personal law of Hindus such as
marriage, adoption, testamentary and intestate succession and guardianship were determined by detailed
and intricate rules found in a number of Smarn texts of Yaggavalkya, Prashara,Man, Haithaand so on.
Several scholars well versed in the nsaamsa rules brought to bear the method of interpreration followed
by ndmamsakar to reconcile, harmonise and interptrert the conflicting or ambiguous statements contained
in different .rnoor in the same nsmi
rid. Foremost amongst thern are Vijraneshwara and Jimutavahana.
The successful application of minamsa rules to the conflicting .rni texts led the British Courts in India
to apply them in adjudicanon of legal disputes pertaining to the personal law applicable to Hindus. After
the codification of most of the personal law of Hindus, recourse to the mimamua principles has fallen
into desuetude. There have been some attempts to revive the mimzamsa principles of interpretation and
apply thern to legal disputes-not necessarily based on ShastraicHindu Law in recent times. A critical
appraisal of such attempts reflected in some judgments is called for.
UR Bhoodan flgna Sami, U.R v. Brajisbore &- Ors., " is one such instance. Section 14 of the Uttar

(1988) 4 S.CC

274.
4

Maxwellv. Mimosa

Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952, as it stood in the year 1968, provided for allotment of land to
"huzibin kissan" (landless agriculturists) and read as under
"14. Grant of land to landlessparsons- The Committee or such other autholity orperson, as the
Committee may, with the approvalof the State Government, speaf eithergeneraly or in rapect of
any area, may, in the mannerpreseibed,grantlands which have vested in it to the andlessperons,
and the grantee of the land shall -

(ii

xxx

xxx

xcx"

Certain persons, who were rich traders in Lucknow city, applied to the Government under Section 14 on
the ground that they were landless persons and land was allotted to them. Their applications were
cancelled by the Additional Collector on a complaint. The allottees challenged the action of the Collector
before the Allahabad High Court and contended that the intendment of Section 14 was to grant lands
vested in the State Government to the 'landless persons'; that they were landlessperon, because they did
not have any agricultural land in the villages, and, therefore, they were entitled to the land. By referring
to the statement of Objects and Reasons and applying the well known Ieydonr Rule,'4 the Supreme
Court held that the words 'landless persons' in the Act can only be taken to mean "landless agricultural
labourers." Inasmuch as the judgment applies Heydons Rule by ascertaining the mischief prevalent before
the statute was enacted, which was sought to be avoided by the statute, and inasmuch as reference is
made to the other sections of the Act and to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the Supreme Court
was applying the well-known Maxwellian principles of interpretation of statutes. However, in para 12 of
the judgment, the Supreme Court suddenly refers to the well known shloka:

3,zftf~L~qt

zr ttf

iqzff-j4~ n

'Prolgue,epilogue, repetition, novelt,
'tatparya'"

utih, praiseand deducton are the indies to determine the

Then, in the next sentence (vide para 14), the Court says, "This exact is the pnhople which desens to be
considered "
A careful reading of the judgment does not indicate how the Supreme Court has applied the cited
principles for determination of taparya. Was it being applied to the entire statute? It could not be,
because the entire statute was not ambiguous. The subject of discussion was the phrase 'landless persons'
used in Section 14 of the Act. So, what was the spakrama (prologue) or npasamhara(epilogue) in the
context? Where was abbayasa(repetition),apurvata (novelty), phakim (result), artha-rada(praise) or oapatti
(Jogical deduction)? In the statute, or in the phrase in question? A reading of the judgment does hot
throw light on these questions. Nor does it show that any of these principles were employed with reference
to the phrase to be construed. Apart from a side wind and sudden reference to the sh/oka, it is not
possible to discern any discursive exercise as to its application. The attempt, I must say with great respect,
however laudable, leaves one no wiser.
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In K.L Sarkarr Mitnansa Rules of laterpretadon," in Part III of the book, there is reference to some
judgments in which the inimanrarules of interpretanon illustrated in the book are stated to have been
successfully applied.
The judgment of the full bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bent Prasadv Hanai Bib 6 is a classic
example of how the English Judges successfully applied the minmamsarules in resolutiop of a dispute with
regard to adoption under the uncodified Hindu Law A reading of the judgment suggests that the learned
Chief Justice John Edge, despite his complete reliance on English translations of several authorities,
correctly abstracted the principle evolved in faiinirI Mmna Suara (1-30) discussed under the topical
title X Fifhelhe4uld4 (1/2/26-30)
Under this topic, after debatng the pros and consfaiminiarrivesat the conclusion that where the sentence
of the fbrd'gives a reason for the injunction, the entire sentence must be considered not as an obligatory
injunction (vidn), but only as praise or arthoreda. In the purma omwsa tradition it is only the injunctive
part that is authoritative. Other sentences which are merely descriptive or eulogistic are considered relevant
only as subordinate to the injunctive shrwakw. An arthaweda is not independently autioritative, but
derives its authority only as supporting a vidh." That is why mimamsakas are astute to assign a secondary
authority to such rakyar by discovering a tidhi raka and by subordinating the laudatory sentence or
arthanada to the nVIi akya on the basis of ekanakyata (subordination).?
Japindi exemplifies the principle of hertwmaim da by reference to the Vakya from TaittingaBralhmana 'he
perjorm thrsacrice by a winnoiing basket; it s by i hat anna (Yood) s made."' A doubt arises as to whether the
sentence should be created as an obligatory injunction or as a mere eulogy or arthavada.This sentence,
according to Jaimini,is not to be interpreted as an injunction, but as praise of the shrpa.Jazrainiconcludes
that where a Brahana Vakya contains a reason for an injunction, it is to be treated merely as a praise
artharada.andnot as an obligatory injunction.
The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court applied this principle in resolving the doubt with regard to
Vasbishlhai text pertaimng to adoption. The relevant part of the sidii text (as quoted in Colebrooke
p.3 87) said:
"but I no man prt or accept an on4 son, nce he must remain to raise up a progeny
obseqider of ancertor. "

for the

Hence, ir was held thattext was not injunctory and that the adoption of an only son was not null and void
under the Hindu Law as it existed then.
In the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Narayan Prodik V/a/atju v. Laxman DajiSirsekar," the
Court was concerned with the question as to whether certain property which was acquired by a woman
by prostitution could be inherited by her sister or whether the property must go by escheat to the Crown.
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The Court noticed that there was no express smnh text relating to the succession of a prostitute. The
Court applied the principle of atdsha from Jaimf M'haeva Sar (Chapters 7 & 8) and held that in
order to determine the right of a sister to succeed to the property of the prostitute, the texts relating to
her right to succeed to saprtwinadha da)aof a male may be considered as applicable by analogy. Thus, it
was held that she would he liable to succeed, if the female prostitute is her nearest sapinda.The Court
came to the conclusion rapidaarelationship les in the connection through the particles of the same
body in view of Mritakshrai definition? Consequently, the doctrine of escheat was held not applicable as
the sister was entitled to succeed to the property of the deceased prostitute.
Similarly, the principle of atideshrn was applied in the SibrananiaZyi ar. Rathanazh Chet.f Relying on
the principleof adderha inJamini(Chapters 7 & 8), it was held that, though there was no text in the 3iritir
expressing the right of a shodra to succeed to the property of a concubine's son with no brothers and
other heirs, such a right could be founded on analogy and ahdesba.
As far as application of the onr'amsarules to the resolution of legal disputes turning upon the interpretation
of smirins is concerned, there would appear to lesser difficulty for more than one reason. First, a .miiti is
accepted as pinvana as it is supposedly based upon recollection of shtwd injunctions, according to the
tenets of mimamsa. Secondly, the writers of the smritis were themselves well-versed with the pada, raka
andpramanasbastas.Nonetheless, there were some conflicting opinions rendered by sadriikaras,possily
enhanced by subsequent commentaries. In such circumstances, resolution of doubts by recourse to
principles of nadmanzraappeared to be not only legitimate, but entirely desirable, despite the candid admission
by some of the English Judges that they were handicapped by lack of knowledge of Sanskrit language.
How do we apply these principles to words, not of a shrtti or smbtih, but of secular origin found in
legislative enactments? Wie principles which flow from common sense and worldly wisdom mnay be
applied regardless of whether they are recognised by mimarsa - there is considerable difficulty in
application of the technical rules of miwnamsa to current statutory interpretation for several reasons.
Some judgments of the Allahabad High Court have attempted to use the rules of mnimafar for resolution
of disputes in situations which did not concern therhastaicHinduLaw. In my respectful view, the results
have been unsatisfactory and somewhat confounding as the following discussion of such cases would
show

SardarMohammadAnsar Khan v. State of UttarPradeshn
In this case both the Petitioner and the Respondent were appointed as clerks in a college. The Court had
to determine their seniority inter-se. Though, the Petitioners relied upon the UP. Directorate of Education
Ministerial Service Rules, 1983, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the said Rules had no
application as they applied only to employees of Directorate of Education and only to teachers. Regulation
3(1) (b) of the UP Intermediate Education Rules, stares that if two or more teachers are appointed on
the same date, their inter-se seniority shall be fixed on the basis of age. Despite the finding that the said
rules had no application to non-teachers, the learned judge claimed to use the ahdethaprinciple of mimamia
and applied this rule to a non-teacher. The reasoning of the learned judge is that, since there was no

a W, 7ati
a
*
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2 1.L.R. 1917 (41) Mad. (ED.)
4, CMWP No. 9249 ofI 1990 decided on October 11, 1992, per Katiu,J.
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express rule as to how the seniority of non-teaching employees in educational Institutions appointed on
the same day was to be reckoned, the court could justifiably use the atidesha principle to apply the rule
which was framed in respect of teachers. Assuming that it has nor been set aside in appeal, the judgment
is open to several objections.
In the first place, the word aodsha only means extrapolation. This principle has been used byvahni in
adYgWa 7 & 8 of his smtrn. To consider its true purport it is necessary to explain two technical terms,
prakdihand rikd used by him. The Shnrdlays down a model sacrifice, calledpraknt. Let us assume that
a model sacrifice had steps 1-50, which had to be performed as prescribed in the shr. Another sacrifice,
wherein only some of the steps were similar, would be called vikri, wherein, say the steps 40-50, were
different. In such a situation,]aimid advocates the extrapolation of the required steps prescribed in the
prakrtinto the vikrm. Thus, the basis of ahdesba is that the nknit is to be modelled upon theprakrai,but
with stated differences. In such a situation, where only some of the steps of the 'ikiti are delineated in
shrd, the pnnciple of atidesha would apply and rest of the steps could be extrapolated from the pmktid
and read into the nikid
hi the situation arising before the Allahabad High Court, which was the equivalent of the prakiti and
which was the equivalent of the vekdt? The legislation neither defined them, nor gave any indication. In
the absence of a well defined prakid and a vikrid application of aidesha would be wholly arbitrary and
based upon the fancy or the pse &,atof the court.
Udai Shankar Singhi v. Branch ManagerL.L C. Bhanvarvari
The petitioner had taken two insurance policies from the Life Insurance Corporation of India (L.I.C.).
While travelling on a two-wheeler, he met with an accident with a truck due to which his right leg had to
be amputated above the knee and his right hand was also paralysed- The LI.C repudiated its liability on
the ground that the disability sustained by the petitioner was not a'permanentdisability' as defined in the
policy and, therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to the payment for permanent disability. The definition
of 'permanent disability' in para 110 of the policy of insurance interaba declared:
.. or in the ampatation o both bandsat or above the writ or in the amputaion of bothfeet at or
abow ankles, or in the amputahon of one bandat or above the wnist and onefoot at or aboe the
ankk shall alro be deemed to ronshintesch diabi&As"
Thus, while an accidental injury resulting in amputation of one hand and one foot was contractually
defined to be a permanent disability, since the victim had suffered only the amputation of one leg and
paralysis of the hand, it did not strictly fall within the definition of 'permanent disability' in para 10 of
the policy. After referring to several judgments on purposive construction, the Court referred to Ncapsha
Bbatta's'Panwua Laghn Margusba'andthe concept of lakshuana discussed therein. It also referred to Kaya
prakasba, of Mammata and Sabhya Darpana by lishmanathaas wel as the bloka Vanika of Knmani' Bhafta
and deduced that in the present case 'amputation of hand' should be construed to mean 'the hand
becoming useless' (whether by amputation, paralysis or otherwise) and that that amputation of the hand
was only illustrative, and not exhaustive, of the intent On this reasoning, a writ of mandamus was issued
to the Li.C, to pay the claim of the Petitioner.

'

CNTWP Na

3807 of 1993 per Karu 2nd Sanr, 1J nf the Allahgbad High Court-

Maxwe//v. Mirnaa
What was the principle on which the claim was allowed despite an indication to the contrary in the
contract of insurance evidenced by the terms of the policy? In the first place, it was nor a situation of
/akrhana. The words used were explicit and clear and there was no question of tapap-anzwpatt so as to
give rise to lakbana Lakshana or figurative meaning may be adrruable as a figure of speech in literature,
but would hardly be acceptable in a judgment deciding the rights and liabilities of parties. The judgment
also refers to the often quoted sentence "kakebhj dalbiraksbyhtaan/'which literally means -protect the
curd from crows," but is held to be indicative of the intent that the protection must be from all animals
and insects which could harm or spoil the curd (incidentally, this would not be an instance of lakrhana,
but of upalakrbena). This principle is no different from the principle of eusdemngeneis. It would, however
be, dangerous to apply the principle of eyudemeneis for interpretation of a contractual term. Indubitably,
an insurance policy is a contract between two parties. If the doctrine of upolaksbanawere to apply to para
10 of the insurance policy, there could be myriad cases where the insurer would become liable for
compensation, though the parties had been careful to init the liability by defining die term 'permanent
disability as in para 10 of the policy in the present case. Even if the judgment is right on equity, with
great respect, I am afraid that resting it on the mimamsa principle quoted therein does not appear o be

justified.
Amit PlasticIndustry, Ghaziabadv. DivisionalLevel Committee,Meerut"
The petitioner had sought a writ of Mandamus against the respondents for issue of an eligibility certificate
inder Section 4A of the Utrar Pradesh Sales Tax Act and for a further direction restraining the respondents
rom passing assessment orders for the period covered by the eligibilit certificate. Section 4A of the Act
on ferred certain benefits to new units set up during the period endingwith March 31, 1990. The relevant
art of the explanation to Section 4A reads as under.
'Explnadon-- For the purposes of this seeion:(1) 'new unit during the period endmig with March 31, 1990' means an industial
ndertaking set-up by the dealer on or after October 1, 1982 but not later than MaCh 31, 1990D=X

XiOV

{) wing machiner accessoies or components not alreaa used, or acqiredfor
use, in aqy otherfactory or wodethp in India."
Court allowed thewrit petition for the reason that the condition in clause (d) could not be interpreted
narrow or strict manner.It stated that the object of Section 4A was to give a fillip to development of
stries and that a strict literal definition would defeat the said object. Consequently, the Court opined:
In ouropinian Clwse (1(d) of the Explanadon of Section 4A of the UP Sales Tax-Actsbor/d
not le interpretedliteralyfor thatwould subvert te pey intentin of Secton 4A zim, to encomrage
the indutririd~ratonof the State. In ouropinion Clause (d) shouk be interprtdtomean that to get
the beneit of exempdo a swbrtand rpatof thefactoy machinery shoNld not hare ahead been
usedin any otherfacto or workshop."

WP Na 372 of 1989 decided on November
einafter A4wi Ptis teinag]

l0,, 1993
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While this reasoning may be justified, it is difficult to appreciate the strained application of gunaprodhana
maxim of minamsa, or the pejorative comment:
"..f..tis deep/i regrettablethat tn our orts of lawj layces quoteAdafxwelland Craicsbt nobocly
rgrs to tbe Aimamsa Pn@/es of Inteipretateon. Today our so-called educatedpeop are kargeft
ignorant about the gratintellectualachieveuents of our ancestorsand the intellectualtreasuy they
le bequeathed MS."
Examples ofgompradhana maxirn given frum jaiismtra3 3-9t, 6-3 39 and 3-1-3-" and their application
to the facts of the case appear to be somewhat strained and far-fetched. A reading of the judgment does
not indicate to an ordinary reader the true basis on which the principle rests and the manner of its
application to the fact situation to resolve the legal dispute.
The basic tenet of the ;rimarsakasis that the commands expressed in the Vedas (shruitakya) are a selfvalidating source of knowledge (prarnana). However, they distinguish between injunctory statements and
non-injunctory statements in the shni. They firmly hold that the entire purpose of the shrd is to teach
such action as is otherwise incapable of being learnt from other valid sources of knowledge. Hence, they
deny authority to statements which do not fulfil this purpose. 2 Consistent with this view, they divide the

shruti texts as vidhi, mantra,namadheya,nishedha and arthavada.
Vidhi is an injunction commanding that something be done. This is of four types:)
ii)

ntpatti vidhi, which is an originative or creative injunctionY
rigoga vidhi, which is an applicatory injunction and lays down the details of the
sacrifice,31

ii)

prayoga idhi, indicating speedy performance of the injunction and lays down the
performance of the principal and subsidiary parts of the sacrifice.

IV)

adbikaraiidbi,which declares the person entitled to carry out the act-

Mantra is the text which helps to remember the procedure for a sacrifice.
Namadheya is the text which designates or names the materials to be used for the sacrifice.
Nishedha is the prohibitory injunction.
Arthavada is the text which extolls or denounces some action.
According to the mimamusakas, the performance of the prescribed sacrifice produces merit or capoorea
which inheres in the performer and leads to production of the desired result. They call the principal part
of the prescribed sacrifice as angland all its subsidiary parts as angas.These arc also known by the terms
pradhana and guna. The efforts of the mimamsakas were always directed to ensure that the pradbanais
fulfilled. Towards this end, they modify and read as subordinate all texts which are guna. This is the real
meaning of the terms. Hence, to apply this principle, one must correctly identify the shrui text which

5 tfar~~tz4 Clnlai fa

ae4 tilnim Jairnir (6-3-39).

For e.g. zrtA
zrw ("He who desires haven shall perform the sacrifice"),
For -g. zuf4ram r
i4iw ("He who desires strong organs shsl sacrifice with curd").
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prescribes the pradbanaand then read all other guna texts as subsidiary thereto and in a manner not
inconsistent therewith, The pradhanaand gima cannot be arbitrarily decided by anyone's ipse dixit
Keeping these principles in mind, we may now critically scan the judgment in ArnitPlasficludushy. Even
assuming the Act to be similar to a shru text, how does one determine the prodhanathere? The Act does
not declare it, First, we make an assumption as to what the intent of the Act is; then we have to read
clause 1(d) of the explanation to Section 4A to conform to this discovered intent of the legislation by
artificial application of the ganapradhanamaxim and then discover its true construction. The effort made,
while commendable for its novelty, resembles the attempt to count sheep by counting the total number
of legs and then dividing the total by four!
The concept of ahdesha, which has been advocated as a mode of interpretation, needs to be further
analysed. Aidesba is not any arbitrary extrapolation, but controlled referential reading as enjoined by the
shrni.
Jaimini classifies ?idbis into three further kinds-anarabhajyidhi,praktiakkya and chodakarakja.The
anarablyavdhiis a scattered text which belongs to no context. The prakriivakalays down the procedure
of model sacrifice. The chodakavakya is the text showing the relation between the model (prakitz)and
modified (vikdih) sacrifices. According to mimamsa, a chodaka vakya is indispensible for determining the
relationship between the model and the modified sacrifice, and the relationship between the parts and
the whole; it helps in determining which actions are parts of a whole and which is the whole of which
they are parts. It is this which determines if the modification of the model is to be determined by
qualifications (Vi/hirtha) or by extrapolations (addesba).
In MahasirPrasadDwivedi v. Sate of UtarPradesh" the petitioner who was elected as the Chairman of
Town Area Oran, was removed from the Chairmanship by an order of the District Magistrate, Banda
dated 10.1.1992 made under Section 7A of the Uttar Pradesh Town Area Act. This order was confirmed
by the State Government by an order made on 21.1.1992. Both these orders vere challenged by the
petitioner before the Court. Section 7A (1) of the concerned Act lays down the procedure for removal of
the Chairman or a member of a committee. Sub-section (1) clauses (a) (b) and (c) indicate the
disqualifications upon incurring of which the chairman or member may be removed. The two relevant
provisos to sub-section (1) of section 7A provide as under:
'7I-o ided, firsly, that before making an order removing the Chairman or the member, as the case

may be, he shall be allowed an opportuniy to submit his explanadon on the chargesor chare against
him:
Provided, secondy, that no orderfor removal shall take effect unless it is confirmed by the State
Goverwnlent."
The first proviso is the formulation of the principle of natural

justice that before removal one should be

given an opportunity to be heard. The second proviso merely postulates that no order for removal shall
take effect unless it is confirmed by the State Government.

n

CAMWP No. 6318 of 1992 decided onjuly27, 1992 by Karju.J of the Ailahbad ih
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The contendon of the petitioner was that the State Government had granted its approval under the
second proviso without giving him an opportunity of hearing, The question before the Court was whether
a second opportunity of hearing before approval by the State was necessary? It was possible to take the
vi; as held by the learned judge, that the compliance with natural justice must be read into every part
of the stature. It was also be possible to argue that the said principle should be read into the second
proviso. The learncdjudge having relied on a number of authorities to support this view, thereafter went
into a tangential discussion of the mimnamsa principles of interpretation. The judgment states:
' 11 Mimamsa, casus asur is known as adbrbara. Tn adbyabam puinapkpermnts r to add
nwdi to a egal text. Honezrr, the s;periorit of the Miwamsa Princirles ozr Ma.xell Prwanles
in thi respect it shonw by the fact that Maxuve//does notgo intofartherdetail and does not mendon
the sub-catgones comingunder the general category of casus omisus. In the Mimamsa 4stem, on the
other hand, the general category of ad/Dahara has under it several sub-categories e.g., anusanga,
anikarsha,etc. Since in this case wve are concerned with the anusangapincjpk, I may explain it in
some detail
The principle of adbyahara does not permit the random and arbitrary interpolation of words into a shrad
text. The concepts of anshanga, anukarsha, tadatkarsha and tadapakarshahaveall to be read and understood
within the context of the basic principles of mmniamsa. It is only by useftul application of this the principles
that the smid6writers resolved the dispute- On the words of the statute concerned, one cannot say that
the opportunity to submit an explanation, which is prescribed in the first proviso, must necessarily be
read into the second proviso. It is also not possible to say that the two provisos can be read as principal
and subordinate with the same theme. The purposes of the two provisos appear to be different. While
the first requires compliance with natural justice, the second proviso ensures that the removal of the
incumbent is confirmed at the highest level of the State Government. Requirement of confirnation by
a high authority is an accepted principle in Administrative Law to ensure that justice is done. Even
without recourse to the principles of minama, it was possible to arrive at the same conclusion by reliance
on the principles of interpretation a la Maxwell.
Although, the nyayas or principles developed by wihranmsakas were intended to resolve doubts arising with
reference to performance of sacrifices ordained by the .rhrnd, they are also based on robust common
sense and worldly experience. To that extent they can be adapted for the task of interpretation of statutes.
This can be demonstrated by reference to some of the mimamsa nyaysas and the identification of the
principles underlying them.
Aruni Nyaya
There is a text in the Taittrecya Sambi/a which says "'Mlwrr iti-d esse-q itW itUIrIf
(33
He bys
saa nith a red, ye/lon-eyed,year old cow.") The principal object here is the buying of saa; the description of
the animal is merely an adjunct. Since the cow is merely the means of buying the soma, the adjectives
describing its qualities are held not to be the conditions precedent to the purchase of soma. Thus evolved
the Aruninyaya which means that when a desired object is described by qualities which are mere accidents,
they would be treated as superfluous in the transaction.

Taittireya JambJita6.1.6.7.
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GrahaikavaNyaya
Take the tahya " IT
i R
J1Tit"
'f ('Ti washer thecap mth the jikering doth ') In the soma
sacrifice several cups are used for drinking Though here the reference is in the singular to one cup, the
word "a" is used to denote all cups used in the said sacrifice. Thus, the principle postulated is that when
an object predicated belongs to a class, what is predicated of one applies to the class.
Varcho Nyaya
The priest chan ting the Kraan
tra "R 1A U-4 if
F W
"
agring') does not recite it for himself but on behalf of theyajamana.

A gAi,let there he my spledour i the

Pashvekawa Nyaya
The number gender used in the noun is significant and represents an object of that number or gender.

RathakaraNyaya
The shritext q
tJTOT Ji1t
enjoins that a Rathakar shall perform Agyadbasa in the monsoon.
The doubt here is, whether the word Rathakara means a maker of chariots,, as the etymological meaning
of the word suggests, or if it means a man of mixed catse, as the conventional meaning of the word
denotes. By adopting the rule that the conventional meaning is stronger than derivaive meaning,' the
word Rathakara is held to mean a person of mixed caste.
There are many more such s'ayswhich are frequently referred to in rmiamsatexts. An exhaustive discussion
of all such yayas is neither feasible nor necessary here. But the point to be driven home is that each iiiya
needs to be examined against the background in which it has developed and the universal rule behind it
needs to be extracted and formally recognised before the ,ays as such can be used in legal interpretative
exercises.
Conclusion
The applcation of the miwansaprinciples for resolution of doubts and conflicts in statutory interpretation,
at least as R present advised, appears to be beset with formidable difficulties.
Frt,the correct application of the =rnransaprinciple would require precise knowledge of Sanskrit language,
particularly the principles and rules of its grammar. It would also require precise appreciation of the
schematic representation of the ru text. Commentators like ShabaraKianauilabhaftaand others repeatedly
refer to Panninikrules of grammar as to nominal case terminations, verbal conjugatory suffixes, verbal
adjectival derivatives, nominal adjectival derivatives and compound words, all of which have great
significance in the Sanskrit language. Any attempt to understand the minama satras without a good
working knowledge of Sanskrit language would be counter- productive.

Sard, several of the terms used in the system of mimamsa have acquired conventional meanings by
usage over millenia, just like the technical terms used in the language of law These conventional meanings
may often differ from the lexical meanings. Unless there is familiarity with the technical meanings of
terms used in the system, their usage would become indiscriminate, resulting in chaos.
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Third, adeptness in the use of English language in jurisprudential parlance has been achieved over
centuries as a result of debates in courts of law both in England and in India. Generations of lawyers
have imbibed it and internalised it. While it may not be impossible to effectively substitute it by an
indigenous system based on the Imamsa principles, it can only be attempted after at least two generations
of lawyers are well trained in the discipline of wmiamsa. This can only come about if nimnamsa discipline
along with the requisite study of Sanskrit language together with its grammar and a basic knowledge of
the principles of nya are taught to law students. In the absence of such academic training, to expect
lawyers or judges to understand the fine-tuned technical arguments of mimaivsa would be impracticable,
if not impossible.
Fourthly, a judgment, particularly of the superior courts, is an authority not only for what it decides inter
partes,but also because it is declaratory of the law which it lays down to be followed by the subordinate
courts. If, suddenly, dte principles of wmiamsa are introduced in the judgments of the High Courts or
Supreme Court, it will be difficult for the subordinate courts to follow the principle on which the decision
of the superior court rests. A judgment not being an occasion for explanation of the principles, but only
for their application, it would be impossible to discover or discern the raiodecidendi. The lawyers and the
judges need to becorne thoroughly familiar with the idioms and expressions of the discipline of mirjnusa
before they can debate them in courts of law.
Fina, the different nyayas of miansa need to be formally reduced into universally identified rules, like
the theorems of Euclid or Newton's laws of motion, so that the lawyers and judges may be ad idem on
the true principle to be applied.
Any hasty attempt to introduce m#iauato supplant the M ave&anystem may backfire and cause immense
confusion. As the Garuda Pranaapophthegmatcally says:

"41'r aiurfr trra

.zPrt tiftir

I

'He who forrakers something stable in favour of somethng wnstable, safers doub4. He loses that
bich isfir, and, of course, he loses that which is unstable."
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